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In the paper, we test the effect of local development, regional and lo-
cal policies on the location decisions and productivity of firms. De-
velopment indicators include local research and development activ-
ity or education while policy decisions used in this study encompass 
for example tax rates, investment incentives or road construction. 
The study builds upon a large national panel of firms. Importantly, 
such a rich dataset has rarely been employed for productivity and 
location choice exercises. The paper is composed of two sections 
dealing with location choice and productivity, respectively and we 
compare the effect of variables used in both sections. Among others, 
we find that density of road network positively influenced location 
choice and productivity as well, while a somewhat larger size of ad-
ministration helps new firms to settle but later on, it has no effect on 
productivity. 
Keywords: industrial location, FDI, productivity, discrete choice mod-
els, GMM 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) code: R3, R12, D24, H7, C30, 
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Ebben a tanulmányban azt vizsgáljuk, hogy mi egy térség fejlettség-
ének valamint az ott alkalmazott regionális és a helyi polikák hatása a 
vállalatok telephelyválasztására és termelékenységére. Fejlettségi mé-
rőszámként a helyben folyó kutatás-fejlesztés mértékét és az adott te-
rületen tanulók arányát használjuk. Helyi politikán pedig többek kö-
zött az adókulcsokat, beruházás-ösztönző eszközöket és a helyi infrast-
ruktúra fejlettségét értjük. A tanulmány empirikus elemzését egy 
nagyméretű, országos vállalati panel-mintán végezzük el. Ilyen gaz-
dag adatbázist a korábbiakban ritkán alkalmaztak a vállalati telep-
helyválasztás és termelékenység vizsgálatára. A tanulmány két részből 
áll: az első a telephelyválasztást, a második a termelékenységet vizs-
gálja. Az utolsó fejezetben pedig összehasonlítjuk az olyan változók 
hatásait, amelyek mindkét részben szerepelnek. Többek között arra ju-
tottunk, hogy az úthálózat sűrűsége pozitív hatással van a telephelyvá-
lasztásra és a termelékenységre is, az adminisztratív dolgozók na-
gyobb száma viszont csupán a vállalatok betelepülését segíti, de nincs 
hatással a termelékenységükre.     
 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Various economic policy decisions influence corporate behaviour. Measures 
may be taken at municipal regional or national level. From a policy 
perspective, corporate reaction to economic policy measures and development 
incentives has a great significance. First, European Union development 
policies will either target firms directly or influance them as a by-product of 
cohesion efforts. Second, while several empirical papers discuss the linkages 
between firms and policy in the US or Western Europe, the topic has rarely 
been discussed in the context of a less developed country. In particular, we are 
interested in the effect of local development as well as regional and local 
policies on the location decisions and productivity of firms. We argue that 
policies should - inter alia - be evaluated on the basis of their impact on 
improving the economic environment and business conditions for firms in 
manufacturing. For state involvement in the economy is related to the 
provision of public goods (such as the road network) and to encouragement of 
activities, the effects of which would spill over to other actors of the economy 
such as firms in the industry. Development indicators, which would capture 
these externalities as well as cost factors for firms, include local research and 
development activity, telephone network or education. Policy decisions used 
in this study encompass for example tax rates, municipal and national 
investment expenditures, investment incentives and road construction. 
The study builds upon a large national panel of firms. Rather than following 
sectoral patterns, this dataset allows to analyse firm behaviour directly. Such a 
rich dataset has rarely been employed for productivity and location choice 
exercises. We use several sources for policy and development variables. In 
addition to county-level data that has been available by the Central Statistics 
Office, we use a recent survey on about a hundred municipalities. 
The paper is composed of two sections dealing with location choice and 
productivity, respectively. Results from separate sections will be compared 
and evaluated in the Conclusions followed by some ideas for future research. 
3 2 LOCATION CHOICE 
In the first section, we look at location choices of foreign firms in 
manufacturing. Such companies have chosen relatively small number of 
locations for their production between 1991 and 2003. A key stylized fact is 
the presence of concentration at the national level: a few counties attracted the 
majority of investment. 
Location decisions will be based on three types of factors. Choices will be 
influenced by some geographic properties of counties including size or 
proximity to borders - this is called the first nature geography and these 
features would change very slowly. Location choices as well as behaviour 
(output) of other firms determine second nature geography with sales between 
various firms becoming a key pulling factor. The second nature properties of a 
county may change rather quickly - as the experience of transition in Central 
Europe would suggest. In addition, location choices are influenced by the "one 
and a half" nature: roads, universities or administration capacities that change 
more slowly than firms but nevertheless, adapt to corporate needs as well as 
shape firms’ behaviour.
1
The section is organised as follows. First, we give a brief summary of the key 
theoretical underpinnings of the research as well as surveys of the empirical 
findings of previous papers. This is followed by a presentation of the 
econometric model along with a description of the datasets and variables in 
section three. Subsection three present the results. 
 
2.1 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1.1 AGGLOMERATION AND MARKET ACCESS 
 
Underlying the exercise in this section is a new economic geography approach 
using input-output linkages among firms. Note that most models of new 
economic geography (or NEG) aim at uncovering the essential reasons behind 
both agglomeration and dispersion of economic activity by taking into account 
"second nature" geography features.2
                                                 
1 1For more on this, see Baldwin (2004) 
2 2A detailed description Krugman and Venables (1995) type model may be found in 
4 As for the access to markets, the key idea that firm location depends on the 
proximity of demand was introduced a long ago, and already in 1954, Harris 
devised the simplest aggregate market-potential function. Market potential has 
been first investigated in an international context; proximity to key markets 
and suppliers has been explicitly featured in empirical works explaining 
overall economic activity or per capita income. Redding and Venables (2004) 
argue that a country’s wage level (proxied by per capita income) is dependent 
on its capacity to reach export markets and to manage to get hold of the 
necessary intermediate goods cheaply. Head and Mayer (2005) look at 
Japanese investments carried out in the European Union. 
Results show that apart from a very important market potential measure, a 
number of traditional explanatory variables (e.g. taxes) and agglomeration 
variables turn to be significant as well. Agglomeration externalities were first 
emphasised by Marshall, and formalisation of most such externalities may be 
found in Fujita et al. (1999, Ch. 16.). One such agglomeration force is labour 
migration: an increased population generated greater demand inviting more 
firms to settle in a larger city, and this allowed for a lower import bill and 
hence, lower living costs in general. Another driver of co-location of firms 
comes from the potential of supplier-buyer link between firms, i.e. one firm’s 
output is the intermediate good of another as in Krugman and Venables 
(1995). Thus, firms try to locate close to other firms, hence lowering 
transaction costs. An other reason for agglomeration is the presence of 
knowledge spillover: proximity allows to exchange inventions while 
technology spillovers help increase productivity using other firms’ knowledge. 
Further, labour pooling may be important as firms would enjoy the presence 
of a larger set of labour pool where the specific knowledge required by the 
firm can be fished out easily (Amiti and Pissarides (2001)). 
There have been several papers dealing with location decisions of foreign 
investors and clustering of these firms. Crozet et al. (2004) study location of 
FDI in France and find that firms of the same nationality like to group 
together, locations close to home country are chosen more frequently, and 
some industries (like car plants) have a strong tendency to agglomerate. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Békés (2005). An excellent survey of key hypotheses emerging from models of new 
economic 
geography and their mixed empirical support can be found in Head and Mayer 
(2004). 
5 Similarly, a study by Head and Ries (2001) looks at Japanese investments in 
the US and finds that firms belonging to the same keiritsu tend to settle close 
to each other. Some studies considered countries of similar size and 
population to Hungary. Barrios et al. (2003) look at multinationals’ location 
choice in Ireland to find that agglomeration forces contributed substantially to 
location choices but proximity to major ports and airports was also helpful. 
Urbanization, i.e. denisty of the actual location may foster agglomeration by 
helping face-to-face communication or the spillover knowledge. Of course, 
high land prices and congestion may be a deterrent factor. Coughlin and Segev 
(2000) found a positive effect of urbanisation on location of manufacturing 
plants. Proximity to businesses that provide services for manufacturing firms 
such as banks or accountancies has been proved to attract investments. 
 
2.1.2 DEVELOPMENT, ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPORTATION NETWORK 
 
In a broader sense, regional development has often been investigated. For 
example, Basile (2004) showed that public infrastructure and education are 
attracting forces while crime rate is negatively related to new investments in 
Italy. Several studies considered the role of transportation per se in a regional 
setting. Cieslik (2003) looked at 50 Polish regions to find that both proximity 
of main export targets and road network have been the key magnets for 
foreign investment. 
In the lack of appropriate data, only a few studies investigated the role of 
settlement level determinants of location choice. Holl (2004) analysed 
explicitly the impact of road infrastructure on new manufacturing 
establishments in Spanish municipalities. The paper suggests that 
infrastructure development affects municipalities differently even within one 
region and agglomeration forces operate within a relatively small geographic 
scope. Holl posits that a new motorway will positively affect productivity of 
firms in the very proximity of the motorway but adds that a negative spillover 
to more distant areas is likely as they loose out on investments. Results 
suggest that apart from the size of the settlement, share of educated workforce 
and proximity to major cities attract new investments, while competition 
presents a deterrent force. In contrast with other studies showing positive spill-
over effects from co-location within a region or country, at a lower level of 
aggregation, competition overweighs these externalities. Most interestingly, it 
6 is shown that there is an average 14% increase in firm entry for municipalities 
located within 10km from the new motorway. Outside this 10km corridor, 
distance from motorways plays a small role only. Woodward (1992) took local 
transportation linkages as a separate variable to measure accessibility of 
regional and national markets. Here, interstate highway connection was taken 
as proxy to good access, and the positive and significant coefficients 
confirmed hypotheses. 
Another way to look at transportation infrastructure is to estimate the impact 
of road density. A more developed network should help firms trade with other 
companies in the neighbourhood as well as transport final goods to cities. 
Hence, good transportation within regions allows for agglomeration 
externalities to yield greater profits form specialisation and economies of scale 
or technological spill-overs. In Indonesia for example, Deichmann et al. 
(2005) found that road density positively influences location choice for most 
of the industries. For China, Amity found strong evidence of the importance of 
railway network. 
Note that theoretically, the impact of access to key transportation channels 
may not serve as an attraction force. Recent models of new economic 
geography
3
 suggest that providing a new transportation link between a rich 
and a poor region may excercebate agglomeration tendencies, leading to new 
investment in the agglomerated (richer) area and hence, a greater divergence. 
This important theoretical aspect that is quoted in some recent studies (e.g. 
Basile (2004)) has been generally left out of policy analyses. For example, 
Puga (2002) quotes a report of European Union’s Committee of the Regions 
that emphasises positive impacts of a better infrastructure but disregards 
agglomeration forces that may lead to a loss of industry in the poorer region 
that was originally to be developed. 
                                                 
3 See Baldwin et al. (2003), Head and Mayer (2004) or Martin (1999). 
7  
2.1.3 LABOUR MARKET 
 
In previous studies, various labour market variables have been investigated 
including gross wages, income tax rates, unemployment or the composition 
and skills of the labour force. Theoretically, lower wages reduce production 
costs and higher unemployment provides the necessary labour supply for new 
investments, thus, both should attract FDI. Studies of international location 
choice certainly support this position, while results are quite mixed when 
considering intra-national choice. For example, in Figueiredo et al. (2002) 
local wage has the expected sign, but in other studies like Holl (2004), the 
wage coefficient is insignificant. 
There may be various explanations for ambigous results. Labour migration 
within one country may be strong thus alleviating differences. Different 
industries would use different types of labour in terms of skills and profession. 
The share of blue-collar workers may vary a great deal among sectors and 
furthermore, their wage may differ greatly depending on how skilled they are. 
Hence, the industry profile of a region may well influence the average wages. 
An insignificant or a positive coefficient may just imply that investors are 
bringing in superior technology and hence, require more skilled and educated 
(i.e. more expensive) sort of labour reflected in higher wages. 
 
2.1.4 LOCAL TAXES AND REGIONAL POLICIES 
 
There have been a few studies looking at local and regional taxes as well as 
regional policy initiatives. Woodward (1992) analyses a period of booming 
Japanese FDI activities in the US focusing on greenfield start-ups that, unlike 
foreign acquisitions, require an explicit location decision. Location of 540 
plants are analysed with firms assumed to have freely chosen a US state and a 
county. Interesting explanatory variables include various tax rates, the 
presence of industrial policy (at the state level) and manufacturing 
agglomeration, racial and educational mix of population or labour market 
features (at the county level). High taxes did serve as a deterrent at the state 
level but the local property tax seemed to have no direct effect. As for the 
8 county level regressions, labour market variables proved to be important 
determinants of location choice. 
Measuring state policy towards FDI was not easy. Woodward (1992) used an 
index developed by Luger (1987) and it includes land and building subsidies, 
debt and equity capital support, job training, infrastructure improvement and 
site preparation. Another instrument is the presence of state-level investment 
and export promotion offices operating in Japan. In the early eighties only 15 
US states had such office, but by the end of the decade most states had 
established such institution. Interestingly state effort had no significant impact 
while, an office in Japan proved an efficient tool to attract investments. For 
the late eighties and early nineties, Kim et al. (2003) considers new 
manufacturing FDI plants in the US to analyze the effect of industry 
promotion programs
4
 by states. The impact of expenditures on FDI attraction 
programs was estimated and found to have a positive and significant effect. 
Moreover, Kim et al. (2003) suggested that promotion expenditures may be 
used to offset the lack of agglomeration. For example, 100 thousand dollars 
worth of promotion should have the same effect on FDI attraction as 
increasing the number of manufacturing plants by 3300. 
Another way of looking at regional policy is to consider national initiatives to 
attract FDI into certain areas of the country. Barrios et al. (2003) find evidence 
that higher public incentives in Irish designated areas have increased the 
probability of multinational investment. In the United Kingdom, Devereux et 
al. (2003) examine whether discretionary government grants influence firm 
location. It is found that policy instruments in the form of regional grants do 
have some effect in attracting new firms to supported location, but this effect 
is rather small. 
In several Central and Eastern European countries, special industrial zones 
were created to attract foreign investors. Several studies argued that zones 
would have a favourable impact. However. for Poland, Cieslik (2003) found 
that when controlling for access and agglomeration variables, the existence of 
such zones had no considerable impact on the number of investments. 
Spending on incentives and infrastructure should have a favourable impact, 
but bureacracy as a potentially important impediment to investment must be 
                                                 
4 4 In the US, there exists a central database, the "State Export Program Database" 
that collects state programs prepared by the National Association of State Development 
Agencies. 
9 taken into account as well. Deichmann () investigated the impact of local 
bureaucratic costs of doing business in Indonesia and found that the occurance 
of local interventions has a small negative effect, especially for regulation 
sensitive industries, such as tobacco. 
Although local taxes have been found to be a deterrent force for firms (Bartik 
(1985), Papke (1989)), sensitivity was often found to be rather low and highly 
variable among industries and firm size (Freidman et al. (1992)). Looking at 
growth of establishments in Maine (USA), Gabe (2003) found that the local 
(personal) property tax rate has a negative effect on establishment growth but 
local government expenditure variables show little or no correlation with firm 
development. Local taxes in particular have an adverse effect, but the 
coefficients are almost negligable in size. 
 
2.1.5 HUNGARIAN RESULTS 
 
Agglomeration of investments and a spatial polarization have also been visible 
phenomena in many sectors. For example, manufacturing of electronic devices 
by firms such as Flextronics in Central and Eastern Europe can be found in a 
fairly narrow band from north Poland through the Czech Republic, West 
Slovakia, West and Central Hungary down to North Slovenia and Croatia.
5 To 
our knowledge, the impact of such variables on firm location in Hungary has 
not been investigated in detail. However, various agglomeration forces have 
been described and shown to be in work in Hungary and several policy and 
infrastructure variables were used to explain development patterns. 
Barta (2003) described regional differentiation in post-transition Hungary 
giving a good example of agglomeration forces in work in the automotive 
industry. In Hungary, suppliers to the car plant of Suzuki are shown to be 
settled in neighbouring counties of Komarom-Esztergom megye, where the 
Suzuki plant is located. Further, second wave of suppliers that settled directly 
to service the plant are on average much closer to the factory than the 
suppliers during the first half of the nineties. There have been several studies 
discussing the role of accessibility in influencing municipal and regional 
development in Hungary. Németh (2004) examined which variables could 
explain income per levels and unemployment rates in NUTS4 “kistérség” 
                                                 
5 For details see Barta (2003) 
10 regions. Unemployment rates were substantially lower in regions close to the 
Western borders as early as 1990 and the East- West division remained an 
important explanatory variable throughout the nineties. Apart from the usual 
measures of income (education or age), proximity to the capital city as well as 
the Western border have been key in explaining higher wages. Proximity to 
other borders proved to be insignificant. 
Fazekas (2003) is closer to this research as it considers FDI and not 
development in general. In the focus of the paper lays the impact of FDI from 
a labour market perspective to study the impact capital inflow had on the 
regional structure of the country. The paper finds that concentration pattern of 
foreign-owned enterprises is just marginally higher than that of the 
domestically owned ones. However, FEs are concentrated in a different 
pattern, being located closely to the Western border. The approach of this 
paper is somewhat different to Fazekas (2003) in that it investigates the 
agglomeration patterns of foreign firms only. 
 
2.2 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
Firms choose a location by maximising the (expected) profit function that 
depends on several explanatory variables. For parsimonious notation, let us 
introduce   as the measure of county level income, the vector of 
variables   that includes all industry specific access variables   
for county level wages. Further, all county level aggregate measures (such as 
the size of road network or university students) are included in the   
vector. Survey based averages of municipal level policy variables are captured 
in the   vector. (see detailes below). As a result, our expected 
profit function for a firm   is: 
() 1 − t r INC
()
j
t r ACC 1 − ()
j
t r wage 1 −
() 1 − t r County
() 1 _ − t r avg local
i
 
where the error term,   includes all the non-observed variables.  () () i
j
t r ζ
Note that explanatory variables that have a time dimension are lagged one 
year for two reasons. The economic rationale (see "time-to-build" models) is 
that firms may be assumed to spend a year between investment decision and 
11 actual functioning (that is picked up by the data). The econometric support 
stems from a requirement to try to avoid endogeneity, and lagging will free the 
model of simultaneity bias. We also need to assume that firms at time 
considering values of explanatory variables at time  1 − t t , pick a county 
independently of each other. Agglomeration works as firms locate close to 
other firms that had settled previously, but there is no strategic interaction 
between firms settling at time t. This is a necessary assumption for using the 
logit model. 
In this econometric structure, one may assume that firms base their location 
decision on expected profits conditional on choosing a particular location. 
However, they make errors due to unobserved features of the various 
regions/settlements as well as inability to make perfect decisions. However, 
the likelihood of choosing a particular location does indeed depend on the 
expected profit there. This gives the basis of the Random Utility Maximisation 
(RUM) models such as ours. The econometric model that follows from RUM 
models is the McFadden (1974) type conditional logit. However, for several 
setups, it may be shown to be equivalent to the Poisson model and Figueiredo 
et al. (2004, p. 203.) shows that the Poisson concentrated log likelihood is 
"identical to the conditional logit likelihood with some constraints." 
The advantage of count data models is their applicability for large choice sets. 
The conditional logit model may well be applied for studying regional 
decisions, but is inappropriate for the analysis of settlement level choices. In 
this paper, we use count data models to get results that may later be 
comparable with results on settlement level decisions.  
 
2.3 COUNT DATA MODELS 
 
In our count data models, the dependent variable represents the number or 
frequency of a particular event, in our case, the number of investments in a 
particular county for a given year and industry. In these models, coefficients 




Define   as the number of investments in industry  ()
j
t r n j, region iand time t. 
The expected value of the number of projects is: 
 




where the  X s are the explanatory variables. For every year, firm entry data 
were aggregated by industry and county, and Poisson regressions were run 
with the same set of explanatory variables used at logistic regressions. 
 
2.3.2 NEGATIVE BINOMIAL 
 
The Poisson model has the advantage of being closely related to the 
conditional logit, but it assumes that the conditional variance of the dependent 
variable,  λ  equals the conditional mean of λ . However, equidispersion is a 
rare property of firm level data, and for most cases, the variance is larger than 
the mean. Overdispersion may be treated, but in a more general, negative 
binomial model that allows to test the null hypothesis of equidispersion.
6
 
Given their easy applicability, no wonder that both the Poisson and the 
negative binomial model have been used in location research.
7 The negative 
binomial distribution may be considered as a generalized Poisson, where the 
mean does not equal the variance. This deviation is represented with a 
                                                 
6 6Importantly, the negative binomial model yields more efficient test statistics and 
prevents 
us from drawing overly optimistic conclusions (see Cameron and Trivedi (1998)). 
7 For example, see Basile (2004), Holl (2004) 
13 dispersion parameter, α . The case with  0 = α  corresponds to equidispersion, 
and in that case the model collapses into a Poisson model. 
 
2.4 DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
To study location choices, we distinguish four types of forces. First, classic 
variables include gravity type variables (size, income par capita) and labour 
market measures as well as economic geography variables that are centered 
around two key determinants of location: agglomeration externalities and 
market access. Second, we use several municipal and regional infrastructure 
and development variables. Third, policy variables from the municipality 
survey (such as local tax rates) are included. Due to data availibility, empirical 
results in this paper are based on county level data. Table 1 summarizes 
variables for this county level exercise. 
 
2.4.1 BASIC DETERMINANTS AND ACCESS VARIABLES 
 
Classic determinants include the measure of income per capita as well as 
labour market features such as the average regional wage. To measure 
consumer demand, two variables were created as the total income is taken as 
income per capita multiplied by size of population. In addition to this, foreign 
demand is estimated with a proxy of access to foreign markets. Wage is 
measured by the average county level wage. Economic geography variables 
are based on the concept of market access that posits that firm location 
depends on the proximity of demand. Building on Békés (2005), input-output 
linkages between firms are taken into account and two corporate access 
variables are estimated, one for the county and one for the rest of country. 
These variables include both access to suppliers and corporate customers. 
Note that agglomeration externalities such as technology spill-over are not 
measured directly, but the local own-industry output variable picks up such 
effects. 
Other economic geography models incorporated input and/or output 
competition among firms (Baldwin et al. (2003)). In our case, input 
competition, which is expected to be important locally, is picked by the non-
own industry access variables. Output competition shall be more important 
14 nationally and hence, the national own-industry access may indicate such 
force.  
 
2.4.2 MUNICIPAL AND REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
We know that municipal infrastructure in general positively affects the 
productivity of firms operating at or in the proximity of the actual settlement. 
As a result higher expected profits should attract more firms in the areas. 
Below, variables of the vector   are discussed.  () 1 − t r County
First, we take KSH data on county aggregates to measure human infrastructure 
such as the presence of research activity and administration capacities - all 
relative to the population of the county. R&D is measured by the number of 
research centers (at universities or elsewhere), the number of employees at 
such centers, and the annual expenditures at these centers. The role of 
universities is also captured by the number of students enrolled at high 
education institutions in the given county. 
Second, administration capacities are measured by the size of personell as well 
as expenditures on IT and the number of PC computers. In addition to this, 
investment in physical capital at government and local institutions are both 
measured directly, in forints. 
Third, the transporation infrastructure within counties is captured by the 
number of telephone lines and the density (i.e. km/area) of various types of 
road networks (total, motorways, other roads). 
 
2.4.3 POLICY VARIABLES FROM THE MUNICIPALITY SURVEY 
 
The MTA-KTI/Median municipality database is composed of two surveys. 
The first one includes answers to questions on drivers of municipal activities 
with responses from the Mayor’s office. The second survey is filled in by the 
municipal adminsitration and questions are related to financial features. 
Below, variables of the vector  are discussed.  () 1 _ − t r avg local  
For the basis of this analysis is the county, we simply averaged responses from 
various settlements within each counties. (The survey included districts of 
15 Budapest but unfortunately, excluded Zala county.) This is of course imperfect 
for several firms are not located in surveyed settlements, and for example, 
actual local taxes may be quite different from one area to another. 
Accordingly, insignificant parameters would either signal the lack of 
explanatory power in economic sense or suggest that settlement level 
heterogeneity is substantial even within counties that prevents inference. Note 
that most questions in the first survey are related to a period in time. 
As for the first part, the   variable measures the importance of 
large-scale infrastructure related investments between 1995 and 2004. This 
includes projects defined as "road construction/improvement", "infrastructure 
development", "transportation development" or "industry parks/areas". The 
variable ranges between 0 (if there was no infrastructure related investment 
carried out) and 4 (if four out of five major projects were such investments). 
projects surv_infr_
Costs of fixed investment is captured by land prices that are given for 1995, 
2000 and 2004, so missing years had to be estimated based on these three 
points using a simple linear method. Prices are related to areas for industrial 
activity, with utilities and a road connecting the settlement and the area. Not 
all municipalities gave figures but there were enough to estimate county level 
averages. 
Tax policy is captured both by the nominal tax rates and presence of 
concessions. The variable of the local tax rate payable for enterprises is based 
on their output (and not the profit). The rate is given by the municipalities 
ranging between 0% and 2%. The survey included figures for 1992, 1995, 
2000 and 2004, so missing years had to be estimated based on these four 
points using a simple linear method. 
In addition we have special variables to take into account various concessions 
offered by municipalities to investors. The first such variable refers to 
occasions when an area for manufacturing purposes were provided free or 
with a deep discount for new firms. For every settlement, another dummy 
takes on 1 where a special tax allowance was promised for new firms (for 
"recent years") and so it refers to a general approach toward new 
manufacturing plants. A further concession dummy takes unity when the 
municipality offers training for new firms. 
16 2.5 RESULTS 
 
As for the classic decision variables are concerned, Poisson results (equations 
[1], [3]) suggest that high per capita income implies more new firms. Of 
course, when various explanatory variables of development are included in the 
regression, size and significance of the per capita variable decline. Lower 
labor costs persistently lead to more new investments as well. Access 
variables are important determinants of firm decisions. The presence of own 
industry is the most stable determinant, but national access to suppliers and 
customers is also important. The negative sign of the presence of local firms, 
excluding those operating the same industry, may reflect a strong input 
competition, while the negative sign of the national presence of firms in the 
same sector points toward output competition that is not offset by positive 
externalities. Distance from foreign markets is always one of the strongest 
determinants of location choice. Importantly, the entry of various county 
feature variables hardly affects the access variables save the access to business 
services that is highly correlated with other measures of development. 
Looking at the development variables, road network is reassuringly positively 
related to location choice.
8
  Similarly, a positive effect is generated by the 
development of the telephone network, while a positive but weaker effect is 
generated by the number of students at local universities. Employment in 
research and developments centers is also an important factor, while the 
introduction of other R&Ð variables provides no significant information any 
further. 
Although the Poisson specification comes from the Random Utility 
Maximisation framework, the likelihood ratio test of equidispersion fails for 
all specifications we have tried, and the overdispersion parameter ranges 
mostly between 0.3-0.4. Thus, we turned to the negative binomial 
specification that allows for overdispersion. Importantly, qualitative results are 
mostly unchanged (see equations [3] versus [4] or [11] versus [12]) although 
the significance level would sometimes differ a great deal between the two 
                                                 
8 When estimated separately, motorways alone enter with a strongly significant coefficient. 
However, the best explanatory variable is generated by including all types of roads.Results 
are available on request. 
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9. Note further, that when we include many variables that are 
correlated with the average wage variable, its the significance would disappear 
(as in equation [5]). To remedy this, we included an industry specific county 
wage available for 91% of all industry-year-county combinations. Indeed, the 
wage variable becomes negative and significant once again ([6], [7]). 
Apparently, administration capacities (available for 1995-2002 only) matter as 
the total employment of public administration offices enters strongly 
suggesting that firms appreciate cities that offer decent administrative services 
(see equations [6] or [10]). Interestingly, other features such as employment or 
investment in information technology, seem to have no impact. 
10
Higher local taxes are shown to be a deterrent of new firms. In addition to 
altering taxes, cities can improve business conditions by providing 
concessions for new firms. The provision of explicit tax allowance has a very 
strong positive impact and offering education subsidies looks like a decent 
signal of business friendly environment, too. In contrast, the number of 
infrastructure related projects seems to be incapable of picking up the pace of 
development in an area. 
The effect of higher land prices in most cases is slightly negative but 
insignificant - this may be taken as proof that municipalities may give various 
concessions but leave land prices to market forces. The dummy for special 
industrial area is very unstable and mostly insignificant. We suspect that a 
favourable property deal may be offset by signals of a poor area. Remember 
that these results (equations [4], [8] or [10]-[12]) being based on the municipal 
survey should be taken with care due to the scarcity of data for several 
counties. 
Finally, we looked at the impact of public investment variables (available for 
1996-2002 only) that pick up investment carried out first by the central 
government and second by the local one. It was found that local expenditure is 
strongly negative while the central government effort is mostly positive but 
                                                 
9 This robustness is not unusual in the literature, for example Smith and Florida (1994) 
finds a similar pattern for Poisson, negative binomial and even for the Tobit model. In this 
paper, we mostly presented results with the negative binomial regression – results with the 
Poisson are available on request. 
10 10As expected, IT expenditure and number of PCs are closely correlated, and 
individually both enter with the same sign. 
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11
  This suggests that firms perceive the costs that local 
investments incur while disregard those in case of central efforts (equation 
[13]). 
Eventually, location choice features may have changed through time. For 
several cases, we included time effects to treat some of these problems that 
may have been masking important effects. Due to the lack of data for several 
years, a few variables may have lost explanatory power when data is analysed 
for a sub-period only. For example, the standard deviation of local tax rates 
between 1993 and 1998 is half than what it is for 1999-2003. When time fixed 
effects are introduced in equation [14], the negative sign for this variable 
returns even if being significant at 10% only. 
Overall, these results confirm that all types of variables do indeed influence 
location choices. 
 
3 THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
The main question of this section is the effect of specific policies on the 
productivity on firms. Using data on municipality investment expenditure, 
research and development spending, and different aspects of public 
infrastructure, we study if firms become more productive because of higher 
public inputs. 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The recent stream of literature on the productivity of public infrastructure 
began with the study of Aschauer (1989). Similar studies were published by 
Munnel (1992) and Holz-Eatkin (1988). These studies used time series data 
for the United States, to estimate an aggregate production function. These 
production functions used three inputs: labor, private capital and public 
capital. Accordingly, the typical equation estimated would look like this: 
 
                                                 
11 Investment at a regional level is a relatively poor measure and it is biased towards human 
capital. Thus, it may have little correlation with actual investment in physical capital. 
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where   refers to aggregate private capital in year t,   is aggregate public 
capital,   is the aggregate labor employed,   refers to other variables, for 
example utilization rate, and   is the error term. These studies found that the 
impact of public capital was very large. In Aschauer’s study for example, the 
elasticity of the public capital on output was even higher than that of private 
capital. Furthermore, in Munnell’s study the estimated marginal productivity 
of public capital was 60%, thus a $1 increase in public capital would lead to 
$0.60 increase in the output. 
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These first results led to several debates about the role of public infrastructure 
in the United States. If the coefficient of public infrastructure is so high, then a 
very high level of public spending is adequate. These results show that 
reduction in the expenditures on public capital may very well explain the 
slowdown of the productivity growth in the United States. The policy 
implication of these results is clear and strong. Several researchers found the 
estimated parameters unreasonably high and the method used unconvincing. 
Some critique was based on the argument, that time-series modelling is 
inadequate when studying the effect of public infrastructure on private output. 
These problems can be corrected with the application of new statistical 
methods for time series data. The other possibility is to use panel data (for 
example state data in the United States), which corrects for some of the 
weaknesses of this approach. 
A more fundamental critique came from Berndt and Hansson (1991). They 
argue that the production function approach is inadequate because of three 
reasons. First they argue, that the Cobb-Douglas production function used in 
previous studies, is too restrictive, consequently scholars should use and 
advise more flexible functional forms. The second problem is that some right-
hand variables are endogenous. The authors refer to the labor input and 
utilization rate. The third problem is that with the production function 
approach one cannot determine how much public investment is useful, thus 
the production function approach is inadequate for normative policy analysis. 
Berndt and Hansson suggest usingthe application of the duality theory, and 
estimating the cost function instead of the production function. Duality theory  
20 provides enough restrictions to estimate the relevant parameters of the model. 
In effect, researchers, applying this methodology, estimate the conditional 
factor demand functions, and by using their coefficients structural parameters 
can be calculated. Having structural parameters, it is possible to estimate the 
shadow value of the different factors. This value shows the value of another 
unit of the given input for the firm. This has fundamental importance in 
normative policy analysis, since from the shadow value of public capital one 
can determine the optimal quantity of public capital. 
Using this methodology Berndt and Hansson (1991) find positive coefficients 
for public capital for Sweden from 1960 to 1980. Their estimates are 
significantly smaller than the ones they get with the production function 
approach. Indeed, the coefficients estimated by the cost function approach are 
much more reasonable than those estimated by the production function 
methodology. 
Finding small positive or insignificant coefficients is common in later 
literature as well. Holz-Eatkin (1994) applies a more sophisticated production 
function estimation for state data, using instrumental variables to handle 
endogeneity and simultaneity bias. This study finds that public capital has 
essentially no role in private productivity. Garcia-Mila et al. (1996) estimates 
a Cobb-Douglas production function for state-level data for the United States 
from 1970 to 1983 using first differencing. They differentiate three kinds of 
public capital: highways, water and sewers and other public capital and find 
none of them significant in their favoured specification. Morrison and 
Schwartz (1996) using the cost function framework find positive coefficients 
of public capital on private productivity, thus the shadow price of it exceeds 
zero. 
These kind of questions are not only important in the US and other rich 
countries, but they are of fundamental relevance for less developed nations. 
For these countries it is a very important question, what kind of infrastructure 
to build in order to promote economic growth. There is an important public 
debate about the sign and the magnitude of spillovers from public 
infrastructure. Some argue that roads and highways can have negative effects 
on the economy of a region as transport costs decline. Consequently, firms 
should not locate in those regions, given that firms from other regions would 
compete more successfully with local ones. Moreno and López-Bazo (2003) 
argue that public infrastructure can produce benefits for the region where it is 
built, and at the same time it can produce spillovers to other regions. The 
  21authors argue that this spillover can be both positive and negative. With it’s 
connectivity it enhances interrelationship between regions (positive 
productivity spillover), but it can increase factor migration, thus harming the 
region, which competes with the given region for labor and mobile capital. 
The study, using Spanish provinces as units of observation, finds positive 
effect of public capital for the given region, but negative spillovers from 
neighbouring provinces. Boarnet (1998), using county-level data for the 
United States, also examines the possibility of negative spillovers from public 
infrastructure. He finds positive effects of the public capital in the given 




The above mentioned literature concentrates on estimating regional aggregate 
production (or cost) functions and study the effect of public infrastructure on 
this production function. We decided to study firm-level production function. 
With this methodology we measure something else that the mentioned 
literature. We measure how the public infrastructure effects the productivity of 
individual firms. In our opinion this viewpoint is very important: we can see 
how the different policies effect the productivity of existing firms. This 
question is important both from normative and positive viewpoint. From the 
normative viewpoint we can see this way what the effect of the policy in on 
the actual taxpayers. On the positive side the legitimacy of the policies is 
mainly determined by it’s effect on the actual actors of the economy. 
We admit, that our method has some disadvantages compared to the method 
customary used in the literature. The firm-level production function approach 
do not take into consideration how the number of firms changed in the given 
period, which we studied separately in the previous section. Another weakness 
of this procedure is that we do not study the economy as a whole, as a 
significant section of the economy is not included in our estimation, as not all 
firms are included in our sample. We think however that this method has more 
statistical advantages than disadvantages. First using a firm-level sample we 
have much more observations than using regional data. This makes it possible 
to control for several kinds of structural brakes. 
Because of the rapid change in the Hungarian economy and the regional 
inequalities in this country makes controlling for regional and time structural 
  22brakes inevitable. Second, the parameters of the production function of 
different industries may differ from each other. As in the different regions 
there are great difficulties in the structure of industry, the estimated 
coefficients can be biased because of this composition effect. Third, we expect 
that measurement error is less a problem with firm-level data then with 
regional data. The main reason for this is the much richer sample for firm-
level data, but the regional data has several other problems: the presence of the 
shadow economy and aggregation problems can be very serious limitations. 
We use the production function approach. Although, some of the criticisms of 
this approach are valid in our opinion, but the use of dynamic panel data 
models makes it possible to estimate production functions even with 
endogenous inputs. On the other hand our possibilities are restricted by data 
sources. With the data at hand this appears to be the more efficient choice. 
For the estimation we use a Cobb-Douglas production function, with 
unrestricted returns to scale. The estimation procedure is similar to Halpern 
and Muraközy (2005). Because of the large sample size we do not constrain 
the elasticity of labor and capital to be equal in the different industries. The 




where    is the value added of firm   in year t, deflated by the industry 
specific price index,   is the labor employed by firm i in year  ,   is the 
capital employed by firm i in year t (deflated by the industry-specific price 
index); 
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1 α   and  2 α   are the elasticities of labor and capital, respectively. Z  
denotes the control variables. From the equation one can see that they are 
multiplied by t, thus we assume that they have an effect not just on the level 
of productivity but on productivity growth as well. When differentiating, these 
variables do not disappear.  X  denotes the variables of interest, mainly public 
infrastructure and industry policy variables.    denotes the industry and 
regional dummies and their interactions. The regional dummies mean the six 
great planning-economic regions (NUTS-2). With this specification we allow 
different growth rates in different regions for different industries. 
i D
  23Without such an extended dummy set we were not able to get robust results. 
 is the firm-specific fixed-effect, and   denotes the disturbance in the given 
year. 
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There are several econometric problems in connection with the estimation of 
production functions. The most important problem is that the inputs of the 
firms are endogenous, as when firms make their input decisions they take into 
consideration their likely future productivity, which is not observed. This 
means that input choices can be correlated with the unobserved characteristics 
of the firms, including past productivity. This phenomenon was emphasized 
by for example Blundell and Bond (1998). This problem can be handled by 
using dynamic panel model estimators. Our preferred model is the estimator 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Although some other (and more 
complex) methods were proposed since that time, we prefer this estimator 
because of it’s robustness and simplicity. This estimator works in two steps. 
First we differentiate the data to eliminate the firm-level fixed effects. Second, 
the lags of the variables are used as instruments for the differences. This 
method produces consistent estimates even for endogenous inputs. 
  243.3 DATASET 
 
Our main dataset is a subsample of the Hungarian tax dataset. This is a 
similar, but somehow different dataset then the one used in the previous 
section. The number of observations per year is reported in the following 
table: 
Year   Number of observations 
1992   3,696 
1993   4,020 
1994   4,100 
1995   4,175 
1996   4,619 
1997   5,131 
1998   6,151 
1999   5,501 
2000   5,919 
2001   5,784 
Total   49,096 
 
As we can see the dataset involves more than 49,000 observations. In the 
estimation the actual number of observation is significantly less, because of 
missing data, lagged dependent variables, and because we do not have data for 
consequent years. 
This dataset contains balance sheet and other accounting data of the firms, 
which makes it possible to calculate the important variables for the estimation 
of the production function. From the viewpoint of this work the most 
important problem was to find the location of firm, which is not included in 
the original tax dataset. To find it out, we employed the wage survey, which 
  25involves the location of work for the given worker. This dataset consists firms, 
which employ at least 10 employees, but not all such firms are included. The 
sampling technique is such that the sample is strongly biased towards large 
firms. Some firms operate more than one plant. Theoretically this makes 
possible to estimate on a plant-level basis, but unfortunately we cannot 
separate the assets and the output in any meaningful way. Because of this we 
decided to aggregate the number of employees in different plants of the given 
firm in all years, and the location of the plant with the most employees was 
taken as the location of the firm. This method do not take into account the 
spatial structure within the firms (like the division of headquarters and the 
other parts of the firm), and does not allow firms to change their location. 





We present the results in table 4. The coefficients of the industry and region 
dummy variables are not reported. In the first column we report the basic 
specification. To control for some of the characteristics of settlements, we use 
general development variables,   (the number of criminal affairs  rate crime_
per capita),  ,   , 
 and  . All these variables are 
calculated from the T-Star database. In our opinion we are able to control for 
the level of economic development of the given municipality with these 
variables. To avoid complications, we used the last available value of these 
variables to control. We assumed that the level of these variables has effect on 
the growth rate of productivity. From the table it is clear, that none of these 
variables is significant, although their signs are the expected ones. The only 
variable with a ’wrong’ sign is the tax base per capita variable, which is 
negative, although one would expect higher productivity in regions with more 
income. 
settlement in wage averag _ _ _ capita per lines tel no _ _ _ _
rate nt unemployme _ capita per base tax personal _ _ _ _
The insignificance of these variables suggest that our dummy variable set 
controls for most of the economic-demographic characteristics of the different 
municipalities. As the variables are jointly significant, we use them as control 
in the following. 
  26In the second specification we check if the investment allowances has any 
effect on the productivity of firms. The source of these variables is the same 
survey as the source of ones in the previous section. As in this exercise the 
unit of observation is the firm, it is possible to employ settlement-level 
variables. This has the advantage of more precise estimates, but the sample 
size is smaller, as only limited number of settlements is included in the 
MTAKTI/Median survey. Otherwise the variables are the same and calculated 
in the same way as those in section 1. 
We expect that investment allowance variables have effect only on the 
location choice of firms and not on their productivity. On the other hand it is 
possible that more mobile firms are more responsive for investment 
incentives, and these firms have different characteristics in terms of 
productivity than others. This selection effect can lead to significant 
coefficients. Thus the second specification is an indirect check for the 
presence of this selection bias. As these variables are only given for one time 
period, we assume that they effect the growth rate rather than the level of TFP. 
In the second column we report the results of this specification. We found that 
none of the investment incentives has a significant effect on the productivity 
of firms. This confirms our hypothesis, that investment incentives have no 
effect on the productivity of firms. This also suggests indirectly that there is 
no selection effect, thus more mobile firms have no different characteristics in 
terms of productivity. 
In the third specification we investigate the effects of public capital, which is 
the main question of this section. As we do not have reliable data about the 
stock of capital, we use investment data. This means no problem, as in the 
estimation we use differences anyway. The only problem is that in this way 
we can not take depreciation into consideration. Although it is a very 
disturbing problem, we could not find reliable source of data for this. 
To see this we use two variables.  ( ) govt central inv _ _ ln  denotes the logarithm of 
government investment per capita in the given county in the previous year. 
 denotes the logarithm of municipal investment per capita in 
the given county in the previous year. Both variables are reported by the 
Central Statistical Office of Hungary, in it’s statistical yearbook for every 
year. This separation of government and municipal investment makes it 
possible to see which of them is spent more productively. 
( govt local inv _ _ ln )
  27On the other hand we have to admit that government investment is very 
volatile, as for example highway investments and other projects has a long 
lifetime. It would be possible to use TÁKISZ settlement-level data, but we 
have chosen county level variables rather then settlement-level variables 
because of two reasons. First county-level variables seems to have better 
statistical properties than municipality level investment data, as there are lot of 
zeroes in that kind of data. Second, most of large investment project has 
effects which spill over from a given municipality, and with county-level 
variables we can get rid off these complications. 
Both variables are significant at 5% level. The government investment has a 
positive effect on the productivity change. This suggests that public capital is 
productive. It is obvious however that the coefficient of the public capital is 
smaller than the coefficient of private capital. Thus our estimate seems to be 
reasonable: the elasticity of public capital is about 1/8 of the elasticity of 
private capital. This fact suggests that our methodology is capable for studying 
the effect of public infrastructure. Using firm-level data and controlling for the 
endogeneity of inputs by using dynamic panel data modelling, it is possible to 
obtain reasonable estimates. In our opinion this method is a useful alternative 
of cost-function modelling, which can be obtained from firm-level panel 
datasets. 
Municipality investment has a negative effect on the productivity of firms. 
The sign of this coefficient contradicts our expectations. It is possible that 
local investment is productivity-enhancing, but it is possible as well that this 
result is driven by some statistical problems. 
In specification (4) and (5) we investigate if different infrastructure variables 
has effect on productivity or not. Thus we follow Garcia-Mila et al. (1996), by 
distinguishing different kind of public capital. In specification (4) we 
investigate if these variables effect the growth rate of productivity, in 
specification (5) we investigate if they have an effect on the level of 
productivity. The estimated equation in (4) is the following: 
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in specification (5), the estimated equation is: 
 
where ￿are the variables of interest:  ( ) density network road _ _ ln  is the logarithm 
of the lagged length of the most important roads in the county per capita. 
 is the logarithm of the lagged value of the 
people working on R&D in the county, 
 denotes the logarithm of the lagged 
ratio of number of computers and state employees in the county, 
 denotes the logarithm of the lagged number of state 
employees per capita. These variables are all calculated from the T-Star 
database. 
( capita per emploxment D R _ _ _ & ln )
)
)
() employment adm adm in computers no _ / _ _ _ ln
( . . _ _ ln c p emp adm
We have to admit that the variation of these variables is not too large, which 
can make the estimates of (5) less precise than the estimates of (4), although 
more correct from the econometric point of view. 
Theoretically the effect of the road density is ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
road density improves the connectivity between firms, which makes 
knowledge spillovers more likely. On the other hand by reducing transport 
cost the competition can be greater, which can lead to lower productivity 
(Moreno and López-Bazo (2003)). The R&D employment captures how 
knowledge-based the production is. The higher this variable, the higher the 
potential for knowledge spillovers. Thus we expect a positive sign of this 
variable. The other two variables capture the inputs used in the administration. 
The better quality of administration should enhance the productivity of firms, 
although the greater bureaucracy is not necessarily good for efficient 
production. Thus we expect nonnegative sign for these variables. 
The   variable is significantly positive in both 
specifications. This suggests that road - as part of public capital – increases 
productivity. This shows, that the positive effect of main roads is stronger than 
it’s negative effects. The benefit of easier transfer and higher spillovers is 
higher than the cost, which comes from the increased competition. These 
results suggest that it is effective to build such roads. 
( density network road _ _ ln
  29The next result is that   has a small but at 
10% significant effect on productivity growth, and insignificant effect on the 
productivity level. In other, unreported specifications we similarly observed a 
small, but significant negative effect of other measures of R&D, namely the 
people employed in R&D activities and the R&D costs. This result contradicts 
the hypothesis of strong positive spillovers coming from R&D of other firms 
in the county. 
() capita per emploxment D R _ _ _ & ln
The   has an insignificant positive effect on productivity. We 
could not show any positive effects of state employees on productivity. On the 
other hand, we found a strong positive effect of. 
 This shows, that the more 
computers the state employees use, the more effective they are in enhancing 
productivity. From these we can conclude that state employees can only affect 
productivity if they use up to date technology. 
( . . _ _ ln c p emp adm )




In the first section of the paper, we estimated count data models to detect the 
impact of various factors on location choice of firms. We considered 
manufacturing companies with foreign ownership setting up a new company 
between 1993 and 2002. Using a set of industry specific access variables with 
intercompany sales, we found that the proximity to sellers and buyers of 
potentially important intermediate goods influence location choices. In 
addition to the location of other firms and wages, it was shown that regional 
development and some public policy measures will influence decisions. The 
key variables found here include industry specific wages, output of the actual 
firm’s industry, distance from export markets, density of road network, 
employment in R&D units. Further, local taxes as well as tax allowance policy 
of municipalities seem to matter.  
In the second section of the paper we estimated the effects of different kinds 
of public infrastructure on the productivity of the firms. For this we used a 
great panel of Hungarian firms from 1992 to 2001. We estimated Arellano-
Bond panel data model to control for the endogeneity of inputs. This 
methodology is different from the one used in the literature, which uses 
aggregate data to estimate aggregate productivity. We found that the effect of 
  30state investment is positive on productivity. The estimated coefficient is 
reasonable, showing that the estimation method used can produce useful 
estimates. The benefits of main roads are higher than their costs of greater 
competition. All R&D variables have small negative effect, which contradicts 
the hypothesis of high positive spillovers. The number of state employees is 
not significant, but the it technology they use has a strong positive effect on 
both the level and the growth rate of productivity. 
It is interesting to compare the effect of variables used in both sections. 
Several measures of development proved to be significant in both cases. Most 
importantly, the density of road network (including motorways) positively 
influenced location choice and productivity as well. Regarding policy, local 
investment in public infrastructure has a negative effect in both cases, as firms 
take investment costs into account, while actions of the central government 
may have a positive impact especially for the productivity of existing firms. A 
somewhat larger size of administration helps new firms to settle but later on, it 
has no effect on productivity. However, the intensity of information 
technology used in offices contributes positively to corporate TFP. As 
expected municipal concessions offered for new firms would influence 
location decisions only. 
 
5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Our main goal in future research is to analyse the effect of spatial structure in 
more detail. First, location choice should be considered at the settlement level 
as well. Second, we are interested to find out if there is a spillover from 
infrastructure development onto "nearby" regions. Indeed, econometric issues 
like spatial autocorrelation of development measures should be taken greater 
care of, too. Third, we plan to look explicitly on the influence of exact 
proximity to transportation infrastructure (such as motorways) as well as key 
public institutions (e.g. universities, administration offices). 
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  35Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Variable Source  Area  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Income per capita  KSH  County  87.234  27.646 
Population size  KSH  County  505.85  339.57 
ACCESS: local own industry  APEH, AKM  County  649437  2637335 
ACCESS: national own industry  APEH, AKM  County  231341  501525 
ACCESS: local suppliers  APEH, AKM  County  1050664  2810798 
ACCESS: local markets  APEH, AKM  County  1879780  5910528 
ACCESS: national suppliers  APEH, AKM  County  354441  574277 
ACCESS: national markets  APEH, AKM  County  621667  1041976 
ACCESS: business services  APEH, AKM  County  72692050  30586220 
LABOUR: average wage  LMS  County  31204.02  14371.81 
LABOUR: industry wage  LMS  County  30362.51  16232.25 
no. telephone lines  KSH  County /settlement  123244  158637 
no. students in university  KSH  County  9803  7332.54 
road network density -total  KSH  County  1526.8  563.77 
ACCESS: foreign market 
distance 
HAS-IE County  254  117.478 
Road distance between cities   HAS-Institute of 
Economics 
Settlement   190.54  103.01 
investment central govt2  KSH  County  18472.36  35035.55 
investment local govts2  KSH  County  8964.692  9951.13 
R&D employment  KSH  County  2067.28  4706.384 
administration employment p.c.  KSH  County  6713.894  14331.58 
adminsitration employment in 
IT p.c. 
KSH County  3281.344  8370.92 
administration IT investment 
p.c. 
KSH County  1362516  6671039 
survey local tax rate  KTI Survey  Settlement average  1.202325  .5751337 
survey land price  KTI Survey  Settlement average  38.59442  60.09663 
survey infrastructure projects  KTI Survey  Settlement average  .8397756  .461991 
D(municip. gives special area 
for investment) 
KTI Survey  Settlement average  .7671508  .2032564 
D(municip. tax invallowance)  KTI Survey  Settlement average  .6357029  .2238097 
D(municip. offers training 
subsidies) 
KTI Survey  Settlement average   .6916895  .2894948 
KSH: Hungarian Central Statistics Office, „AKM”: Input-output tables, „LMS”: Annual Labour Market 
Survey by Ministry of Labour, APEH: Hungarian Tax Authority’s corporate database. NB All variables in 
estimations are taken in logs. 
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Table 2. Poisson and negative binomial regressions of location choice 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Estimation  method  poisson neg.bin. poisson neg.bin. neg.bin. neg.bin. neg.bin. 
ln(income p.c.)  0.69***  0.80*** 0.76*** 0.86*** 0.30  0.23  0.32 
  (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.19) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) 
ln(county size km2)  0.32  0.02 0.36 -0.00  0.56 0.38 0.37 
  (0.25) (0.31) (0.27) (0.35) (0.44) (0.43) (0.46) 
ln(LABOUR: average wage)  -0.42***  -0.65***  -0.15 -0.45***  -0.29    
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.16) (0.20)    
ln(LABOUR:  industry  wage)       -0.78***  -0.85*** 
       (0.10)  (0.11) 
ln(ACCESS: local own industry)  0.24*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ln(ACCESS: national own industry) -0.03*  -0.14***  -0.02  -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ln(ACCESS: local suppliers)  -0.08***  -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(ACCESS: local markets)  -0.09***  -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.05  -0.08**  -0.04  -0.05 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(ACCESS: national suppliers)  0.00 0.21***  0.04 0.25***  0.25***  0.29***  0.29*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
ln(ACCESS: national markets)  0.16*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.08*  0.09** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
ACCESS: business services  -0.26***  -0.19**  -0.32*** -0.25*** -0.32*** -0.13  -0.15 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) 
ln(no. telephone lines)  0.15**  0.20**  0.33*** 0.38*** 0.40**  0.34**  0.24 
  (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
ln(no. students in university)  0.68***  0.78** 0.55** 0.71** 0.20  0.15  0.28 
  (0.25) (0.31) (0.27) (0.34) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) 
ln(road network density -total)  0.28*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.12**  0.13* 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
ln(R&D employment)  0.06**  0.06**  0.09*** 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Standard errors in parentheses , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2. Poisson and negative binomial regressions of location choice (cont’d) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Estimation method  poisson  neg.bin.  poisson  neg.bin. neg.bin. neg.bin. neg.bin. 
ln(survey local tax rate)      -0.25***  -0.22***  -0.08  -0.08  -0.03 
      (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
ln(survey  land  price)      -0.09**  -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 
      (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ln(investment  central  govt2)         
         
ln(investment  local  govts2)         
         
ln (administration employment p.c.)          0.48***  0.43***  0.35** 
      (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
ln(adminsitration employment in IT p.c.)          -0.03  -0.03  -0.09 
      (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.12) 
ln(administration IT investment  p.c.)      -0.03  -0.05  0.04 
      (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
survey  infrastructure  projects         
         
D(municip. gives special area  for  investment)        
         
D(municip.  tax  invallowance)        
         
D(municip. offers training subsidies )               
         
ln(ACCESS: foreign market distance)  -0.43*** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.38*** -0.58*** -0.57*** -0.57*** 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
FE  (time)        yes 
years included  1993/2002 1993/2002 1993/2002 1993/2002 1995/2002  1995/2002 1995/2002
Observations 3000 3000 2850 2850 2280  2091 2091
Model chi-square  7081.70  1874.92  nov.17 1834.67 1409.24 1324.53 1373.82 
df  15.00 15.00 17.00 17.00 20.00 20.00 27.00 
Log likelihood  -4839.71  -4365.87  -4611.64 -4158.88 -3192.60 -3054.15 -3029.51 
Pseudo R2  0.42  0.18  0.43 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
overdispersion alpha    0.42   0.41 0.38 0.33 0.30 
log likelihood test of alpha=0    947.69   905.52 565.37 493.05 438.14 
Standard errors in parentheses , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
N.B. „D” stands for a dummy variable, p.c. - in per capita terms 
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Table 3. Poisson and negative binomial regressions of location choice   
  [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
 neg.bin.  neg.bin.  neg.bin.  poisson neg.bin. neg.bin. neg.bin. 
ln(income p.c.)  0.03  -0.10  -0.12 -0.31 -0.25 -0.49 -0.40 
  (0.24) (0.25)  (0.28) (0.25) (0.30) (0.31) (0.32) 
ln(county size km2)  -0.33  -0.66*  0.05  -0.04 -0.27 -0.87*  -0.89* 
  (0.37) (0.38)  (0.47) (0.41) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) 
ln(LABOUR:  average  wage)     -0.28      
     (0.21)      
ln(LABOUR: industry wage)  -0.72***  -0.84***   -0.81*** -0.86*** -0.72*** -0.80*** 
  (0.09) (0.10)    (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
ln(ACCESS: local own industry)  0.26*** 0.26***  0.27*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ln(ACCESS: national own industry) -0.12***  -0.11*** -0.12***  -0.03  -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.12*** 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ln(ACCESS: local suppliers)  -0.20***  -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.15*** -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.19*** 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(ACCESS: local markets)  0.04  0.04  -0.04 -0.04 0.01  0.05  0.04 
  (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(ACCESS: national suppliers)  0.29*** 0.30***  0.25*** 0.10*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
ln(ACCESS: national markets)  0.04  0.05  0.14*** 0.10*** 0.07  0.00  0.02 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
ln(ACCESS: business services)  -0.07  0.10  -0.24**  0.02 0.00 0.06 0.08 
  (0.07) (0.09)  (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) 
ln(no. telephone lines)  0.27***  0.41*** 0.31**  -0.04  0.13  0.33*  -0.00 
  (0.10) (0.12)  (0.16) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.23) 
ln(no. students in university) 1.06***  0.93**  0.84*  0.89** 0.92** 1.28***  1.58*** 
  (0.36) (0.36)  (0.44) (0.38) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) 
ln(road network density -total)  0.22*** 0.09  0.25*** 0.16**  0.14*  0.19*** 0.22** 
  (0.05) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
ln(R&D employment)  0.11***  0.10***  0.19*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.09*  0.13*** 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
ln(survey local tax rate)  -0.25***  -0.05  -0.20 -0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.34* 
  (0.07) (0.09)  (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) 
ln(survey land price)  -0.09*  0.02  -0.02  0.06 0.07 0.01 0.01 
  (0.05) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Standard errors in parentheses , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
N.B. „D” stands for a dummy variable, p.c. - in per capita terms 
 
 
(Table continued overleaf) 
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Table 3. Poisson and negative binomial regressions of location choice (cont’d) 
  [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
  neg.bin. neg.bin.  neg.bin. poisson neg.bin. neg.bin. neg.bin. 
ln(investment  central  govt2)        0.20  0.26 
        (0.19)  (0.19) 
ln(investment  local  govts2)        -0.61***  -0.45** 
        (0.20)  (0.21) 
ln (administration employment p.c.)      0.50***  0.22*  0.31**     
      (0.12) (0.12) (0.15)    
ln(adminsitration employment in IT p.c.)      -0.01  -0.02  -0.03     
      (0.04) (0.09) (0.12)    
ln(administration IT investment  p.c.)      -0.09 0.04  -0.00    
      (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)    
survey infrastructure projects  0.08 -0.00  0.07 0.13*  0.10 0.10 0.19* 
  (0.08) (0.08)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
D(municip. gives special area for investment) -0.69***  -0.12  0.16  0.13 0.37 -0.02  -0.14 
  (0.25) (0.29)  (0.33) (0.30) (0.35) (0.32) (0.37) 
D(municip. tax invallowance)  0.57*** 0.53***  0.51*** 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.56*** 0.62*** 
  (0.14) (0.14)  (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
D(municip. offers training subsidies )  1.16***  0.83***  0.59**  0.77*** 0.63**  0.71*** 0.95*** 
  (0.22) (0.23)  (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) (0.26) (0.28) 
ln(ACCESS: foreign market distance)  -0.88*** -0.77*** -0.87*** -0.92*** -0.87*** -0.92*** -0.97*** 
  (0.11) (0.11)  (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) 
fixed effects (time)    yes    yes  yes   yes 
years included  1993/2002   1995/2002 1995/2002 1995/2002  1996/2002 1996/2002
Observations 2613 2613 2280 2091 2091  1837 1837
Model  chi-square  1757.64 1864.66  1427.20 4638.24 1398.54    
Df 21.00  30.00  24.00  31.00 31.00 1135.52  1179.62 
Log likelihood  -3959.81  -3906.30 -3183.63 -3231.50 -3017.15 -2647.77 -2625.72 
Pseudo R
2 0.18 0.19  0.18 0.42 0.19 0.18 0.18 
overdispersion alpha  0.35  0.30  0.37   0.29 0.35 0.32 
log likelihood test of alpha=0  778.51 670.54  552.05   428.70 445.73 378.05 
Standard errors in parentheses , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
N.B. „D” stands for a dummy variable, p.c. - in per capita terms 
  40Table 4. Productivity, spillover infrastructure and policy   
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
  production  investment  effect of  
infrastructur
e:   infrastructure 
    function  incentives  investment  TFP growth  TFP level 
  LD.ln(real output)  0.18156***  0.17377*** 0.23594*** 0.18800*** 0.11632*** 
    [0.02022] [0.02402]  [0.03236] [0.02753] [0.03522] 
  D.ln(real capital)  0.15663***  0.14032*** 0.11761*** 0.08069*** 0.07523** 
  [0.02205] [0.02731]  [0.02365] [0.02347] [0.03038] 
  D.ln(labor)  0.38492***  0.45339*** 0.41434*** 0.46723*** 0.34535*** 
    [0.06762] [0.07603]  [0.07605] [0.07257] [0.09566] 
  ln(inhabitants in the given settlement)  -0.00000  -0.00000** -0.00000** 0.00000  -0.00000*** 
    [0.00000] [0.00000]  [0.00000] [0.00000] [0.00000] 
  ln(crime rate)  -0.06701  -0.19242 -0.20276 -0.00050 -0.08262 
    [0.15860] [0.28797]  [0.19284] [0.18949] [0.17442] 
  ln(no. telephone lines per capita)  0.07512  0.17318 0.10539 0.10864 0.08641 
    [0.09282] [0.14262]  [0.10297] [0.10407] [0.08253] 
  ln(unemployment rate)  -0.33087  -0.28300 -0.45545 -0.33608 0.01785 
    [0.29128] [0.49617]  [0.34002] [0.31133] [0.38726] 
  ln(average wage in settlement)  -0.00000  -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001** 
    [0.00001] [0.00006]  [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00000] 
  ln(average personal income tax base)  -0.00005 -0.00004  -0.00012***  -0.00009**  -0.00002 
    [0.00004] [0.00006]  [0.00004] [0.00004] [0.00004] 
  survey infrastructure projects    -0.00511     
      [0.00338]     
  D(municip. gives special area for 
investment)    -0.01819     
      [0.01536]     
  D(municip. tax invallowance)    0.00406     
      [0.01268]     
  D(municip. offers training subsidies )    0.00133     
      [0.01103]     
  ln(investment central govt)     0.01765**   
       [0.00741]    
  ln(investment local govts)     -0.05122**    
       [0.02121]    
  D.ln(road network density)       0.05749* 
         [0.03208] 
  D.ln(R&D employment per capita)       0.00284 
         [0.00965] 
  D.ln(computers in administration, p.c.)       0.06984* 
         [0.03736] 
  D.ln (administration employment in IT)       0.05137 
         [0.03684] 
  ln(road network density -total)      0.00972**   
        [0.00413]   
  ln(R&D employment per capita)      -0.00621*   
        [0.00344]   
  ln(computers in administration, p.c.)      0.10773***   
        [0.01283]   
  ln (administration employment in IT)      0.00212   
        [0.00486]   
  Observations  20068 12983 13990 16281 10905
  Number of id  5603 3663 4815 5082 3738
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
N.B. „D.” stands for difference, p.c. - in per capita terms 
 